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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING MUCH: PROTESTANT 
EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA 
V. TRURO CHURCH 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr. * 
Isaac A. McBeth ** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia u. Truro 
Church ("Truro") involves a property dispute. 1 The core issue is 
who owns or controls property held in trust for an Episcopal con-
gregation after a majority of that congregation votes to disaffi-
liate from the Episcopal Church of the United States of America 
("TEC") and affiliate with a different church. 2 Deciding a church 
property dispute is inherently difficult because courts are gener-
ally "not a constitutionally permissible forum" to resolve eccle-
siastical issues. 3 Indeed, the desire to avoid such issues can lead 
courts to decline to decide particular cases. However, faced with 
the property dispute, a significant procedural history, and the 
need to determine the application of Virginia Code section 57-9(A) 
to the dispute, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided this case.4 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. 
** J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese ofVa. v. Truro Church, 280 Va. 6, 12, 694 
S.E.2d 555, 557 (2010). 
2. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 557-58. 
3. Jae·Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 
514 (2001) (citations omitted). 
4. See generally Truro, 280 Va. at 6--30, 694 S.E.2d at 555-68. Virginia Code section 
57-9(A) reads: 
If a division has heretofore occurred or shall hereafter occur in a church or 
religious society, to which any such congregation whose property is held by 
trustees is attached, the members of such congregation over 18 years of age 
may, by a vote of a majority of the whole number, determine to which branch 
of the church or society such congregation shall thereafter belong. Such de-
termination shall be reported to the circuit court of the county or city, where-
in the property held in trust for such congregation or the greater part thereof 
141 
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This case raises several issues involving church doctrine.5 
However, rather than resolve any of those issues or the broad is-
sue of who owns the property, the court focused on issues of sta-
tutory interpretation and the statute's applicability to the dis-
pute, leaving other issues for the circuit court to decide or decline 
to decide on remand.6 It is understandable that the court took 
such a narrow approach. However, it neither resolved all of the 
issues that the appellants raised on appeal nor provided signifi-
cant guidance to the circuit court regarding lurking ecclesiastical 
issues that may need to be addressed for the underlying property 
dispute to be resolved fully. 7 
This essay reviews the issues the Supreme Court of Virginia 
resolved in Truro and notes important issues it did not resolve. 
Part II supplies the factual background and procedural history of 
the dispute. Part III summarizes the court's opinion and the rea-
soning underlying its determination that Virginia Code section 
57-9(A) is not applicable to this particular action. Part IV criti-
ques the opinion, rioting the issues the court resolved and how it 
resolved them. Part V briefly addresses issues that remain unre-
solved by the court's decision and discusses the implications of 
leaving those issues unresolved. Part VI presents the authors' 
conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 2003, the General Convention ("GC") of the Episcopal 
Church met, inter alia, to address several controversial issues 
within the church,8 including concerns surrounding the accepta-
is; and if the determination be approved by the court, it shall be so entered in 
the court's civil order book, and shall be conclusive as to the title to and con· 
trol of any property held in trust for such congregation, and be respected and 
enforced accordingly in all of the courts of the Commonwealth. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
5. Most importantly, the court faced the issues of when a "division" occurs within a 
church or religious society and what constitutes a ''branch" of a church or religious society. 
Truro, 280 Va. at 22, 27, 694 S.E.2d at 563, 566. 
6. Id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
7. For example, the court declined to address whether the Anglican Communion is a 
church or religious society, arguing that doing so was not necessary to the resolution of the 
action. Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
8. TEC is a province of the Anglican Communion and the principal national church 
following the Anglican tradition within the United States. Id. at 14, 694 S.E.2d at 559. 
TEC is comprised of 111 regional dioceses, which collectively manage the Church's seven 
thousand congregations and two million total members. Id. Within the hierarchical struc-
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bility of allowing non-celibate homosexuals to serve as Episcopal 
bishops and the blessing of same-sex marriages.9 Ultimately, the 
GC took several actions: (1) it confirmed the election of Reverend 
V. Gene Robinson, a non-celibate homosexual priest, as the bi-
shop of one of the dioceses of TEC; (2) it adopted a resolution 
permitting the blessing of same-sex unions; and (3) it rejected a 
resolution relating to the "historic formularies of the Christian 
faith." 10 The actions of the GC gave rise to considerable consterna-
tion on the part of many congregants of the Protestant Episcopal 
Church in the Diocese of Virginia ("the Diocese")Y The diocesan 
leadership's support for Bishop Robinson's confirmation fueled 
some of the discontent. 12 In response to the actions of the GC and 
the diocesan leadership, congregants sent hundreds of letters of 
dissent to the Diocese and some congregations withheld the pay-
ment of pledges committed to the Diocese and TEC. 13 
Throughout 2004 and 2005, the Diocese formed and relied on a 
"Reconciliation Commission" to resolve the concerns of the con-
gregations that opposed the GC's actions. 14 However, these efforts 
failed. 15 In 2006, the Reconciliation Commission promulgated vot-
ing procedures for the congregations to separate from the Dio-
cese.16 Several congregations initiated separation procedures in 
accordance with the protocol but were subsequently informed 
that, due to a change in leadership in TEC, any such separation 
would not be binding on TEC or the Diocese. 17 This guidance not-
withstanding, fifteen congregations voted in 2006 and 2007 to 
separate from the Diocese. 18 Likewise, the actions of the GC 
ture of TEC, the GC acts as the highest governing body and meets triennially. Id. at 15, 
694 S.E.2d at 559. As part of its duties, the GC adopts TEC's Constitution and Canons. Id. 
9. See id. 
10. Id. 
11. See id. The actions of the GC are binding on the dioceses. ld. Each diocese is go-
verned by a Bishop and an Annual Council that, similar to the GC's relationship with the 
national church, adopts the Constitution and Canons for the respective diocese. ld. 
12. See id. 
13. Id. Each congregation, so long as it falls under the governance of TEC, is bound by 
the national and diocesan constitutions and canons. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 15-16, 694 S.E.2d at 55~0. 
17. Id. at 16, 694 S.E.2d at 560. 
18. Id. 
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prompted congregations of several other dioceses to follow a simi-
lar course of action and separate from their respective dioceses.19 
Following their separation, the congregations sought to align 
themselves with another church affiliated with the Anglican 
Communion. 20 The Church of Nigeria-a province of the Anglican 
Communion governing the Anglican churches in the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria-had previously established a mission in the 
United States, designated the "Convocation of Anglican Nigerians 
in America," to provide oversight to expatriate Nigerian congre-
gations therein.21 In 2006, the Church of Nigeria relabeled the 
mission the Convocation of Anglicans in North America 
("CANA").22 CANA formed a new statewide district, the Anglican 
District of Virginia ("ADV''), and received the recently disaffi-
liated Virginia congregations as congregations of ADV.23 This mi-
gration of estranged former Episcopal Church congregations con-
tinued on a nationwide scale. In 2007, ten thousand of the CANA 
congregations' twelve thousand members were former members of 
Episcopalian congregations.24 
Following the exodus of congregants and putative disaffiliation 
of congregations from the Diocese, the issue of what property in-
terests, if any, the congregations maintained in their church 
buildings became of central concern to the continuing congrega-
tions, the disaffiliating congregations, the Diocese, and TEC. Dur-
19. Id. Though the 2006 and 2009 General Conventions left the issues that sparked 
controversy in 2003 largely alone, see THE GENERAL CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL 
CHURCH, SUMMARY OF ACTIONS OF THE 76TH GENERAL CONVENTION (2009), available at 
http://ecusa.anglican.org/documents/GC2009_Summaryo£Actions_2.pdf; THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SUMMARY OF ACTIONS OF THE 75TH GENERAL 
CONVENTION (2006), available at http://episcopalchurch.org/documents/summary_of_Act 
ions_GC2006_ENG.pdf, the issues continue to reverberate in TEC and the Anglican Com-
muniOn. 
20. Truro, 280 Va. at 16, 694 S.E.2d at 560. ''The Anglican Communion is an interna-
tional body that consists of 38 'provinces,' which are 'regional and national churches that 
share a common history of their understanding of the Church catholic through the See of 
Canterbury' in England." Id. at 14, 694 S.E.2d at 558 (citation not provided). The Anglican 
Communion takes action through three different gatherings: (1) the decennial Lambeth 
Conference, (2) the Anglican Consultative Council, and (3) the biennial Primates' Meeting. 
Id., 694 S.E.2d at 559. However, the international gatherings of the Anglican Communion 
are "primarily consultative" in nature, and any course of action decided on by the Anglican 
Communion will affect a regional or national church only if the church formally adopts 
that course of action through its own protocols. Id. 
21. Id. at 16, 694 S.E.2d at 560. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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ing 2006 and 2007, nine CANA/ADV congregations ("CANA Con-
gregations") that formerly were affiliated with the Diocese filed 
petitions pursuant to Virginia Code section 57 -9(A) with their re-
spective circuit courts. 25 In their petitions, the CANA Congrega-
tions maintained that: (1) their separation constituted a division 
within TEC, as contemplated by Virginia Code section 57-9(A); (2) 
they affiliated with ADV, a branch of the Anglican Communion; 
and (3) accordingly, Virginia Code section 57-9(A) conveyed own-
ership interest in the properties to the respective congregations 
located thereon. 26 
Both the Diocese and TEC intervened, opposing the grant of 
the petitions and filing a declaratory judgment action against the 
congregations "seeking a determination of trust, proprietary, and 
contract rights, if any, that the Diocese and TEC had in the prop-
erties used by the CANA Congregations which were the subject of 
the Code § 57-9(A) petitions."27 They challenged the congrega-
tions' petitions on several grounds, arguing: (1) that the congre-
gations' separation did not constitute a division within TEC or 
the Diocese; and (2) that, even if the congregations' separations 
could be perceived as a qualifying division, CANA was not a 
branch of TEC.28 
Pursuant to the Multiple Claimant Litigation Act, 29 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia appointed a three-judge panel to manage 
the dispute. 30 The panel consolidated the proceedings and ar-
ranged for the Fairfax County Circuit Court to hear the matter.31 
At the hearing, the CANA Congregations, the Diocese, and TEC 
presented evidence attempting to define the terms "division" and 
"branch" in the context of Virginia Code section 57-9(A).32 On 
25. Id. at 17, 694 S.E.2d at 560. The CANA congregations consisted of: 
The Church at the Falls-The Falls Church, in Arlington County; Truro 
Church, Church of the Apostles, and Church of the Epiphany, Herndon, in 
Fairfax County; St. Margaret's Church, Woodbridge, St. Paul's Church, 
Haymarket, and Church of the Word, Gainesville, in Prince William County; 
Church of Our Saviour at Oatlands, in Loudoun County; and St. Stephen's 
Church, Heathsville, in Northumberland County. 
Id. at 17 n.7, 694 S.E.2d at 560 n.7. 
26. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 560. 
27. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 560-61. 
28. Id. at 18, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
29. See generally VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-267.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
30. Truro, 280 Va. at 17-18, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 18, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
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April 3, 2008, the circuit court issued a letter opinion in which it 
concluded that "the Diocese, TEC, and the Anglican Communion 
were all 'church[es] or religious societ[ies],' and that CANA, the 
ADV, the Church of Nigeria, TEC, and the Diocese were all 
'branches' of the Anglican Communion for purposes of applying 
Code§ 57-9(A)."33 Additionally, the circuit court held that CANA 
and ADV were ''branches" of TEC and accordingly, the Diocese 
could seek judicial resolution of its potential interests in the 
property at issue.34 
Having established that Virginia Code section 57-9(A) provided 
the controlling authority over the proceeding, the circuit court 
held additional hearings to address the constitutionality of the 
statute.35 Specifically, TEC and the Diocese argued that Virginia 
Code section 57 -9(A) violated the United States Constitution's 
and the Virginia Constitution's free exercise clauses, principles of 
due process, and the contracts clause. 36 However, the circuit court 
upheld the constitutionality of Virginia Code section 57-9(A).37 On 
January 8, 2009, the court granted the CANA Congregations' pe-
titions and simultaneously dismissed TEC's and the Diocese's 
declaratory judgment actions as moot. 38 
On November 9, 2009, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed to 
hear TEC's and the Diocese's appeal from the circuit court's 
judgment.39 In its June 10, 2010 opinion, the court reversed the 
circuit court's order granting the CANA Congregations' petitions, 
reinstated the Diocese's and TEC's declaratory judgment actions 
and the CANA Congregations' counterclaims to those actions, and 
remanded the proceeding to the circuit court with instructions to 
decide the dispute pursuant to principles of real property law and 
contract law.40 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 18-19, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
35. Id. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 561-62. 
40. Id. at 29-30, 694 S.E.2d at 567-68. 
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III. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S OPINION 
The court began its review of the circuit court's holding by es-
tablishing that the assignments of error raised by TEC and the 
Diocese could be broadly summarized into two principal issues: 
(1) the district court erred in holding that Virginia Code section 
57-9(A) controlled the dispute in light of the facts of the cases, 
and (2) the district court erred in finding that Virginia Code sec-
tion 57-9(A) did not violate the United States Constitution and 
Virginia Constitution.41 Applying the principle of constitutional 
avoidance, the court explained it would first determine if Virginia 
Code section 57 -9(A) controlled the cases before evaluating the 
statute's constitutionality.42 
To analyze the applicability of the statute, the court reviewed 
the key terms within the statute that the circuit court relied on in 
granting the CANA Congregations' Virginia Code section 57-9(A) 
petitions.43 Although the court noted that the circuit court's anal-
ysis focused on the meaning of "division," "church or religious so-
ciety," "attached" and ''branch," it opted to primarily focus on the 
''branch" and "division" language of Virginia Code section 57-
9(A).44 The court reviewed the circuit court's definition of the 
terms de novo, with the guiding standard of the analysis being 
that the terms should be assigned their plain and ordinary mean-
ing in accordance with the context in which the terms were used 
and the interrelationship of the words being considered.45 
The court concluded that "whether a congregation is entitled to 
petition for the relief afforded by Code § 57-9(A)" depends on 
whether the congregation can demonstrate the statutory prere-
quisites.46 Namely, "the congregation must show that there has 
been a 'division ... in a church or religious society[ ] to which any 
such congregation ... is attached"' and "the 'branch of the church 
or society' to which the congregation votes to belong must be a 
41. ld. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 562. 
42. Id. (citing Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 557, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 
(2005}}. 
43. ld. at 21, 694 S.E.2d at 562--63. 
44. ld. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
45. ld. at 21, 694 S.E.2d at 563 (citing Sansom v. Bd. of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 
594-95, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999)). 
46. ld. 
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branch of the 'church or religious society[] to which [the petition-
ing congregation] is attached' prior to the 'division."'47 In other 
words, the court adopted a two-step process for determining the 
applicability of Virginia Code section 57 -9(A): (1) the petitioning 
congregation must establish that it was attached to a church or 
religious society in which a division occurred, and (2) the petition-
ing congregation must establish it voted to belong to a branch of 
the church or religious society that experienced the division. 48 
The court explained that the facts in the record clearly estab-
lished that no "division" occurred at the Anglican Communion 
level and the circuit court erred in holding otherwise. 49 Thus, the 
relevant inquiry consisted of whether a "division" occurred within 
TEC and the Diocese.50 Prior to making this determination, the 
court restated, and seemingly adopted, the circuit court's defini-
tion of "division,"-"[a] split ... or rupture in a religious denomi-
nation that involve[s] the separation of a group of congregations, 
clergy, or members from the church, and the formation of an al-
ternative polity that disaffiliating members could join."51 Al-
though TEC and the Diocese argued that a division-as contem-
plated by Virginia Code section 57-9(A)-could only occur when 
completed in accordance with the church's polity,52 the court re-
jected that position on the grounds that such a requirement 
would "risk entangling the courts in matters of religious gover-
nance" in violation of the First Amendment. 53 Additionally, it 
noted that "[w]hile it is certainly possible that a division within a 
hierarchical church could occur through an orderly process under 
the church's polity, history and common sense suggest that such 
is rarely the case."54 Rather, "experience shows that a division 
within a formerly uniform body almost always arises from a disa-
47. Id. at 21-22, 694 S.E.2d at 563 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 
& Cum. Supp. 2010)). 
48. See id. 
49. Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 25, 694 S.E.2d at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52. ''When used in reference to religious entities, the term 'polity' refers to the inter-
nal structural governance of the denomination." Id. at 12 n.1, 694 S.E.2d at 558 n.1 (citing 
Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV. 
1142, 1143-44 (1962)). 
53. Id. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 556; Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 
604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2001). 
54. Truro, 280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d 566. 
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greement between the leadership under the polity and a dissent-
ing group."55 
The court applied this definition of "division" to the facts pre-
sented in the record.56 It noted that "[t]he evidence presented by 
the CANA Congregations clearly establishes that a split or rup-
ture has occurred within the Diocese and, given the evidence of 
similar events in other dioceses of TEC, the split or rupture has 
occurred at the national level as well."57 Furthermore, there was 
no serious dispute that, prior to the 2003 meeting of the GC, the 
CANA Congregations were attached to TEC and the Diocese. 58 
Accordingly, the court held that the circuit court properly con-
cluded a division occurred within TEC and the Diocese and that 
the CANA congregations were previously attached to those bo-
dies.59 
Having established that a "division" occurred within TEC and 
the Diocese, the court turned to the next statutory issue: whether 
the CANA Congregations voted to affiliate with a ''branch" of TEC 
and the Diocese as a result of the division.60 The CANA Congrega-
tions' Virginia Code section 57-9(A) petitions turned on whether 
CANA and ADV were branches of TEC and the Diocese. Noting 
that CANA's expansion to allow the newly separated CANA Con-
gregations to join its ranks occurred in response to the disputes 
within TEC-as opposed to being a result of the disputes-the 
court reasoned that 
while CANA is an "alternative polity" to which the congregations 
could and did attach themselves, we hold that, within the meaning of 
Code § 57 -9(A), CANA is not a ''branch" of either TEC or the Diocese 
to which the congregations could vote to join following the "division" 
in TEC and the Diocese as contemplated by Code§ 57-9(A).61 
It further explained that operation as a separate polity would not 
preclude a religious entity from being a branch of the church or 
religious society that the congregation previously attached to, but 
that "[Virginia Code section 57-9(A)] requires that each branch 
proceed from the same polity, and not merely a shared tradition 
55. Id. 
56. See id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
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of faith."62 Accordingly, because the CANA Congregations did not 
belong to a branch of TEC, Virginia Code section 57-9(A) did not 
control the outcome of the dispute and the action needed to be 
remanded to the circuit court with instructions to decide the dis-
pute pursuant to principles of real property law and contract 
law.63 
IV. CRITIQUE OF OPINION AND COMMENTARY 
The Supreme Court of Virginia resolved the case simply 
enough, deciding that Virginia Code section 57-9(A) did not ap-
ply.64 However, it left many issues underlying the statute and the 
case unresolved.65 The court could have interpreted the statute in 
its entirety by considering the implications of fully defining all of 
the statute's important terms. Indeed, the court began its analy-
sis by approaching Virginia Code section 57-9(A) as a whole-
defining various key terms in relationship with each other-
rather than defining terms in isolation as the circuit court did.66 
However, the court interpreted the statute only as deeply as ne-
cessary to deem it inapplicable, then ended its analysis. 67 In trun-
cating its analysis, the court declined to provide a full analysis 
that might have changed its views underlying its partial analysis. 
That is, had the court addressed some of the difficult issues it ig-
nored, it might have found that the partial analysis that became . 
the core of its opinion rested on a possibly insufficient foundation. 
Nonetheless, given the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the 
court's approach is understandable.68 
The court may have provided its truncated analysis due to a 
concern that it not become too enmeshed in ecclesiastical issues 
surrounding and underlying the statute and the case.69 Unfortu-
62. ld. at 28-29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
63. ld. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567 (citing VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)). 
64. ld. 
65. See id. at 21, 694 S.E.2d at 562. 
66. ld. at 21-22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
67. See id. 
68. Per the principle of constitutional avoidance, the court will not examine the con-
stitutionality of a statute unless it first determines the statute is applicable in the particu-
lar action. ld. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 
557, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005)). 
69. ld. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 565-66 (quoting Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian 
Church, 262 Va. 604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2001)). 
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nately, in declining to address those questions, the court appears 
to have ignored their relevance and existence. Given that the 
court believed it did not need to enter the ecclesiastical thicket or 
fully analyze Virginia Code section 57-9(A) to decide the case in 
front of it, it arguably resolved the case justifiably. 70 However, the 
court's approach leaves an opinion that does not provide much 
guidance for the circuit court or future litigants. The court may 
have believed it impossible to analyze the statute any more deep-
ly without resolving ecclesiastical issues. However, in order to 
give guidance to the hierarchical churches to which Virginia Code 
section 57-9(A) explicitly applies,71 the court arguably should have 
acknowledged the existence of the ecclesiastical issues that arise 
when attempting to apply Virginia Code section 57-9(A) in the 
context of hierarchical churches, even if it could not resolve those 
lSSUeS. 
The court approached Virginia Code section 57-9(A) more 
broadly than the circuit court but possibly still not broadly 
enough. The court noted that proper statutory construction re-
quires that statutory terms be read in relation to one another, ra-
ther than in isolation. 72 Indeed, the court suggested that the cir-
cuit court had improperly defined a number of key statutory 
terms in isolation, rather than in relation to one another. 73 None-
theless, the court did not define all of the terms it could have de-
fined. 
The supreme court defined the terms it believed necessary to 
define and declined to define other terms in applying the sta-
tute.74 For example, it specifically declined to define "church or re-
70. See Alexander v. Allen, No. 1680-09-1, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 66, at *2 n.1 (Ct. App. 
Feb. 23, 2010) (noting that "an appellate court decides cases 'on the best and narrowest 
ground available"' and will "not decide the remaining questions presented in [a] case" 
(quoting Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 58, 64, 628 S.E.2d 74, 77 (Ct. App. 
2006) (en bane))). 
71. Truro, 280 Va. 13, 694 S.E.2d at 558 (citing Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 698, 
152 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1967) (explaining that Virginia Code section 57-9 applies to congrega-
tions of hierarchical churches)). 
72. Id. at 21-22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. The court noted that defining words in a statute 
individually is not the appropriate way to determine what a statute means. Id. at 21, 694 
S.E.2d at 563 ("When considered in the overall context of the statute, a proper construc-
tion of language of Code § 57-9(A) must take into account the interrelationship of the 
words being considered."). 
73. Id. at 21, 694 S.E.2d at 562-63 (suggesting that the circuit court defined "divi-
sion," "church or religious society," "attached," and "branch" in isolation and outside of the 
context of the statute as a whole). 
74. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 562 ("[W]e will first consider de novo the meaning of the rele-
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ligious society'' or determine whether the Anglican Communion is 
a church or religious society.75 The court elided the issue, noting 
there had been no division in the Anglican Communion regard-
less of whether the entity was a church or religious society.76 
However, the court declined to provide guidance regarding how a 
future court ought to determine whether the Anglican Commu-
nion or similar entity is a church or religious society.77 
In discussing the term "division," the court followed a similar 
path and declined to address the implications of its interpreta-
tion.78 The court appeared to recognize that the term "division" 
should be treated as a term of art in the statute, but, for purposes 
of determining if there had been a division in TEC or the Diocese, 
approached the term-like the circuit court did-as if the term 
has a relatively common meaning.79 The court simply retraced the 
steps of the circuit court and concluded that the circuit court was 
correct on some issues regarding the application of "division" to 
the instant situation and incorrect on others.80 The court reviewed 
the evidence that the circuit court examined, including the testi-
mony of experts, and reached a somewhat different set of conclu-
sions than the circuit court did. 81 The court found-as the circuit 
court did-that a division had occurred in the TEC and Diocese, 
vant terms in Code§ 57-9(A), and then apply our construction of those terms to the circuit 
court's findings of fact to the extent that they remain applicable.'). 
75. Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
76. Id. ("[W]e conclude that the circuit court erred in its holding that there was a divi-
sion in the Anglican Communion for purposes of the application of Code§ 57-9(A) in these 
cases."). 
77. Whether the Anglican Communion is a church for purposes of Virginia Code sec-
tion 57-9(A) may be an easy question if the term "church" is supposed to focus on a struc-
tured body or may be more difficult if it is supposed to focus on a shared group of beliefs. 
Compare CHRISTOPHER L. WEBBER, WELCOME TO THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 108 (1999) 
("The Episcopal Church is a member of what is called the worldwide Anglican Commu-
nion: a family of churches spread around the world and sharing a common understanding 
of the Christian faith."), and id. at 109 ("Anglicans took their faith with them and knew 
they had an obligation to share it with others, gradually becoming a family of independent 
churches bound together by a common heritage and a common understanding of the 
faith."), with id. at 110 ("But the Anglican Communion remains an international church 
without a governing body."). 
78. See Truro, 280 Va. at 22-27, 694 S.E.2d at 563-66. 
79. Compare id. at 23, 694 S.E.2d at 563-64 (recognizing the majority of expert testi-
mony attempted to define the term "division" in accord with the General Assembly's inten-
tion when enacting the predecessor statute of Virginia Code section 57 -9(A)), with id. at 
26-27, 694 S.E.2d at 566 (discussing division in the more general application of occurring 
in uniform bodies and applying those principles to the case). 
80. See id. at 22-27, 694 S.E.2d at 563-66. 
81. Id. at 23-27, 694 S.E.2d at 564-66. 
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but that-unlike the circuit court's finding-no division had oc-
curred within the Anglican Communion.82 
How the court reached its conclusions is worth discussion. The 
court chose to define division in a manner that avoided grappling 
with ecclesiastical issues.83 The court noted that it cannot get en-
tangled in ecclesiastical matters. 84 It then suggested that the fact 
that the circuit court's definition of "division" avoids entangle-
ment makes it the proper definition.85 The court specifically de-
clined to accept TEC's and the Diocese's definition of division, ar-
guing that it would require that the court become involved in 
ecclesiastical issues.86 Unfortunately, the court did not provide 
sufficient analysis to conclude that it believed the circuit court's 
definition to be a better reading of the words of the statute than 
TEC's and the Diocese's position.87 It merely argued that the cir-
cuit court's definition allowed courts to avoid entanglement in ec-
clesiastical issues when applying the statute. 88 It is curious that 
the court defined the term without reference to context of the 
term or discussion of the General Assembly's intent regarding the 
application of the statute, given that the court began its discus-
sion of the statute noting that its analysis would be guided in 
that way.89 Moreover, if the court's interpretation is not in accord 
with the context of the term and the General Assembly's intent, it 
82. Id. at 22, 27, 694 S.E.2d at 563, 566. 
83. Id. at 26-27, 694 S.E.2d at 565-66. 
84. Id. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566 (citing Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 187, 327 S.E.2d 
107, 111-12 (1985}}. 
85. See id. at 26-27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
86. Id. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 565-66 ("Inherent in the concept that a division must be 
recognized through a formal process within the church's polity is that the courts would 
ultimately be drawn into an ecclesiastical dispute to determine whether a division as con· 
templated by Code § 57 -9(A) had occurred."). 
87. Indeed, the court restates the definition of the circuit court and applies it, but 
never expressly concludes that the definition is in accord with the intention of the General 
Assembly as it existed at the time it enacted the predecessor statute to Virginia Code sec-
tion 57-9(A). Id. at 25, 694 S.E.2d at 565, 566. 
I d. 
88. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
Moreover, in resolving the issue of whether a division has occurred under the 
standard adopted by the circuit court, there is no requirement that the court 
involve itself in questions of religious governance or doctrine. Rather, the 
court simply determines from the facts presented whether the division has 
occurred, without regard to the nature of the dispute, whether over doctrine 
or some other cause, which lead to the separation of the congregation and its 
attachment to a different polity. 
89. See id. at 21-22, 694 S.E.2d at 562-63. 
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cannot be justified on the basis of constitutional avoidance.90 The 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance suggests that constitutional 
questions be avoided when possible, not that statutes be inter-
preted in any way possible so as to avoid a constitutional ques-
tion.91 
The court came closest to meeting its requirement that terms 
be interpreted in relation to one another in its discussion of the 
term "branch."92 It defined ''branch" in relation to "division."93 The 
court appeared to suggest that a branch of a church can only be 
created as a direct result of a division within the church, as op-
posed to merely being created in response to a division. 94 Thus, 
Virginia Code section 57-9(A) was not applicable in this action be-
cause-even though there was a division in TEC and the Dio-
cese-the dissenting congregations did not join a branch of TEC 
or the Diocese when they aligned themselves with CANA and 
ADV.95 Rather, given the fact that CANA and ADV existed before 
the division and were merely restructured in response to it, the 
90. Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 
178 (2007) (citations omitted) ("If a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, we 
must apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the sta-
tute."). 
91. Granted, the court's jurisprudence requires it to interpret a statute to avoid a con-
stitutional infirmity. Burns v. Warden, 268 Va. 1, 2, 597 S.E.2d 195, 196 (2004) (citation 
omitted). The predisposition to avoid constitutional issues notwithstanding, it is still true 
that construing statutes to cure constitutional deficiencies is allowed only when such con-
struction is reasonable. Va. Soc'y for Human Life v. Caldwell, 256 Va. 151, 157, 500 S.E.2d 
814, 816-17 (1998) (citation omitted). Indeed, it is well settled that a statute cannot be 
judicially rewritten so as to bring it within constitutional requirements. Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844, 884-85 & nn.49-50 (1997) (citation omitted); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers 
Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988). It is important to note that this is not to suggest that the 
court adopted the incorrect interpretation. However, the only express justification the 
court offered for adopting its definition of division is that it was the definition that avoided 
entangling the courts in ecclesiastical issues. Although certainly a valid consideration in 
statutory interpretation, that is not the dispositive issue in defining the term. The disposi-
tive issue is whether the court defined the term reasonably, in accordance with its context, 
and faithful to the General Assembly's intent. There is insufficient comment by the court 
as to whether it did so when it adopted this definition of "division." 
I d. 
92. Truro, 280 Va. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566-67. 
93. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 566-67. 
94. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
95. Id. 
We further conclude that a proper construction of Code § 57-9(A) requires a 
petitioning congregation to establish both that there has been a division with-
in the church or religious society to which it is attached and that subsequent 
to that division the congregation seeks to affiliate with a branch derived from 
that same church or religious society. 
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effect of the dissenting congregations' decision was to join a 
branch of a different church-the Church of Nigeria.96 It appears 
that the branch to be joined must be one that comes into exis-
tence as a result of the division, not one that is preexisting.97 
However, according to the court, though a qualifying branch 
can only be created from a division, it is not a necessary result of 
a division.98 A division can occur within a church or religious so-
ciety without a branch of that church or religious society being 
created.99 The plain statutory language of Virginia Code section 
57-9 appears to contemplate that a branch exists whenever a di-
vision occurs.100 Indeed, the existence of a branch may be the only 
fact that creates a property dispute of the type Virginia Code sec-
tion 57-9(A) is supposed to resolve. The existence of a branch ar-
guably creates the uncertainty as to ownership of the property or 
the allegiance of the congregation that makes the dispute a real 
property issue. If one views a church's or religious society's divi-
sion-as opposed to the existence of personal division among the 
members of the church or religious society-as a separation ("se-
paration approach"), the body of a church splits into two parts: 
the original church and a branched church. 101 Under this separa-
tion approach to the concept of "division," a division creates a 
branch and a branch is proof that a division has occurred.102 
96. ld. 
97. See id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 566-67. In its discussion of the terms "branch" and 
"division," the court briefly discussed the term "attached." Id. at 27-28, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
After interpreting "division," the court interpreted "attached," then "branches." Id., 694 
S.E.2d at 566-67. However, the court did not delve deeply enough into how these terms 
related to one another to provide substantial guidance regarding Virginia Code section 57-
9(A)'s meaning. The court may have sought to avoid addressing an ecclesiastical question. 
However, its decision either avoided the question for just a bit of time or may have inad-
vertently resolved an ecclesiastical question that the court did not want to address. It is 
possible that whether a branch-an attached piece-of a hierarchical, geographically 
based church exists is an ecclesiastical matter. 
98. See id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
99. See id. at 28-29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
100. VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010) (arguably suggest-
ing that a branch exists whenever a division occurs). 
101. The court seemed to hint it agreed with this separation approach-that a division 
necessarily leads to branching-when it discussed the issue in relation to the Anglican 
Communion. Truro, 280 Va. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. However, it clearly rejected such an 
approach shortly thereafter when it discussed branching in the context of TEC and the 
Diocese. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
102. Id. at 28-29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
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The court rejected a separation approach reading of the sta-
tute.103 However, in doing so, it left the precise relationship be-
tween division and branch unclear. What is clear is that, to in-
voke Virginia Code section 57-9(A), a congregation has to join a 
branch of the church with which it had been affiliated.104 It is not 
enough that the congregation merely leave the original church; it 
must divide from the original church and subsequently vote to be-
long to a branch of that church.105 In this regard, the court sug-
gests that a branched church must exist, that the branched 
church must have come about as a result of the division, and that 
the branched church must have a link to the original church.106 
However, it is unclear is whether the linkage between the 
branched church and the original church must be ongoing or if 
the link needs to be merely that the branched church came from 
the original church. The court appears to require, at some point 
after the division and as a result of the division, the creation of a 
formal church that could accept the congregations that had de-
cided to disaffiliate with the original church.107 Without a qualify-
ing branched church for the congregation to vote to belong to, 
Virginia Code section 57 -9(A) does not apply. 108 
Under the court's construction of Virginia Code section 57-9(A), 
it appears that-as a result of the supposed division in TEC-the 
dissident congregations or an entity associated with them could 
have formed an empty church polity with doctrine similar to TEC. 
That polity, whether approved by TEC or not, could have quali-
fied as a branched church of TEC. 109 The dissident congregations 
would then have been free to vote to affiliate with the branched 
church. One could claim that this result avoids deciding ecclesias-
tical questions. However, that is unclear. Whether a separate 
branched church remains connected to a mother church appears 
to be an ecclesiastical question.U0 The court implicitly conceded 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
105. See id. 
106. See id. at 27-29, 694 S.E.2d at 566-67. 
107. Id. at 28--29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. See St. John's Presbytery v. Cent. Presbyterian Church of St. Petersburg, 102 So. 
2d 714, 719 (Fla. 1958) (noting that it would be impermissible to address the ecclesiastical 
question regarding which of several factions of a religious entity was the successor of the 
religious entity). 
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that in its opinion.lll Rather than answer the ecclesiastical ques-
tion, the court restated the question as a technical question of 
branching that could be viewed as non-ecclesiastical. 
At the heart of the issue is the need to distinguish between a 
dissident congregation that leaves TEC and a congregation that 
joins a different branch of TEC. 112 TEC's position is that it must 
make the decision because whether an entity is a true branch of 
TEC is an issue of internal church governance. 113 However, the 
court seems to suggest that allowing TEC to decide whether a 
church is a branch of it would allow the church to decide when 
the statute applies to it. 114 Although allowing TEC to decide when 
the statute applies to it seems inappropriate, the current inter-
pretation of the statute creates this problem, not the church's 
doctrine.U5 
The statute suggests that there is a difference between leaving 
a hierarchical church and joining a branch of the same hierar-
chical church. 116 Specifically, the statute provides the majority of 
the congregation the right to take property "[if] a division ... " oc-
curs within the church or religious society to which they are at-
111. Truro, 280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
112. See In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 76 Va. Cir. 785, 831 (Cir. Ct. 
2008) (Fairfax County). 
113. Namely, this is TEC's point in suggesting that a division must be achieved in ac-
cordance with its polity. See Truro, 280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566. Unless a division is 
achieved in accordance with denominational polity, dissident congregations that vote to 
disaffiliate with TEC are not branches of the church. See id. Rather, they have opted to 
simply leave the Church. See id. 
114. See id. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 565-66. 
115. Specifically, it is the nature of hierarchical churches to exert centralized control 
over those entities affiliated with it. Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 698, 152 S.E.2d 23, 26 
(1967) (describing hierarchical churches as churches "that are subject to the control by su-
per-congregational bodies"). Thus, interpreting the statute as to allow a church to be a 
branch of TEC, although TEC never approved the church as a branch, appears to divest 
TEC (or any hierarchical church, for that matter) of authority that it is exclusively entitled 
to exercise. Thus, were "division" to be read as division in accordance with a church's poli-
ty-in which case, a branch is a necessary result-the hierarchical church would not con-
trol the application of the statute. Rather, the facts of the case would trigger the applica-
bility of the statute. Of course, one could argue that such a standard would create an 
incentive for hierarchical churches to prevent congregations from "dividing." Of course, 
any dispute regarding whether a division occurred in accordance with the church's polity 
would be a question beyond the jurisdiction of the civil courts to resolve. Jae-Woo Cha v. 
Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2001) (noting that 
"civil courts are not a constitutionally permissible forum for a review of ecclesiastical dis-
putes"). 
116. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
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tached.m Thus, this language gives rise to an inference that a 
scenario exists in which a dissident congregation could part ways 
with the church, but that doing so would not qualify as a "divi-
sion."us The court appears to agree that such a scenario exists. 119 
However, the substantive line to be drawn between leaving a 
church altogether as opposed to separating from the church and 
joining a branch of the same church almost has to be ecclesiastic-
al or at least quite related to ecclesiastical issues.120 Unless a 
branch is any formal polity formed by former members of the 
original church-a definition foreclosed by the court's decision-
an evaluation of the theological connection between the branch 
and the original church would seem to require the resolution of 
ecclesiastical questions. 121 Indeed, that appears to be TEC's point 
in suggesting that it must be allowed to decide if a supposed 
branch of TEC really is a branch of TEC. 122 The fact that the court 
did not have to draw the substantive line in this case does not 
mean that the line-drawing is not ecclesiastical. 123 As importantly, 
the fact that the decision has been taken out of the hands of the 
117. Id. 
118. See id. 
119. Truro, 280 Va. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566 ("Indeed, it is clear that a majority vote by 
one or more congregations to separate from a hierarchical church under Code § 57 -9(A) 
would not alone be sufficient to establish the fact of a division. To the contrary, we agree 
with the circuit court that the standard it adopted places a significant burden on the peti-
tioning congregation to establish that the requisite 'division' has occurred and that this 
'division' led to the vote to separate."). 
120. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 
119 (1952) (explaining that the state cannot transfer authority "from one church authority 
to another" or seek to interfere with a "Church's choice of its hierarchy"). 
121. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("[T]he [First] Amendment therefore commands civil 
courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over 
religious doctrine. Hence, States, religious organizations, and individuals must structure 
relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ec-
clesiastical questions."). In that case, the Supreme Court refused to recognize an implied 
trust in a dispute over church property between a local church and the general hierarchic-
al church from which the local church departed. Id. at 449-50. According to the appellee, 
the implied trust was conditioned on the general church adhering to its tenets of faith and 
practice during the time of the local church's affiliation with it. Id. at 443-44. The Court 
explained that "the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory 
requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion-the interpreta-
tion of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion." 
Id. at 450. 
122. See In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 76 Va. Cir. 785, 828, 831 
(Cir. Ct. 2008) (Fairfax County). 
123. See Berkaw v. Mayflower Congregational Church, 144 N.W.2d 444, 455-56 (Mich. 
1966) (indicating that questions involving the existence or nonexistence of affiliation be-
tween congregations and general churches are ecclesiastical questions). 
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church does not make the substance of the line drawing non-
ecclesiastical.124 Rather, it requires that the ecclesiastical line-
drawing be completed by other courts. 125 illtimately, courts will 
need to deal with the existence of the ecclesiastical issues or pos-
sibly give a sterile answer to how section 57 -9(A) applies to hie-
rarchical churches.126 
Courts are involved in an ecclesiastical dispute whenever they 
must distinguish between a group that is leaving the church and 
one that is seeking to join a branch of its original church at least 
when the church disputes whether a branch of it can ever exist. 
In its discussion, the court alludes to, but does not discuss, the 
difference between leaving a church and disaffiliating to join a 
branch of the mother church to which a congregation had been at-
tached.127 Rather, Virginia courts are left with two pieces of guid-
ance. If the body with which the congregation affiliates after the 
division is one merely with a "shared tradition of faith," the con-
gregation has seemingly left the church and affiliated itself with 
an independent religious body. 128 However, if the entity with 
which the congregation affiliates is "derived" from the original 
church and was created as a result of the division, the congrega-
tion has joined a branch of the original church.129 What exactly 
distinguishes these two standards is unknown, and may even be 
illusory. Evaluating whether a church merely maintains a shared 
tradition of faith with another church rather than being derived 
from it is ecclesiastical in nature, particularly as the doctrinal dif-
ferences that trigger the split become more pointed. Furthermore, 
124. Indeed, one might argue that leaving the determination of the existence of a 
branch of a hierarchical church deprives TEC and the Diocese "of the right of construing 
their own church laws ... and ... , in effect, transfer[s] to the civil courts[,] where proper-
ty rights [are at issue], the decision of all ecclesiastical questions." Watson v. Jones, 80 
U.S. (1 Wall.) 679, 733--34 (1871). 
125. See id. For a discussion of this issue, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Biblical Inter-
pretation, Constitutional Interpretation, and Ignoring Text, 69 MD. L. REV. 92, 100-02 
(2009). 
126. A relevant question that remains unanswered is whether the Supreme Court of 
Virginia provided the lower courts a neutral principle by which to apply the statute. Pres-
byterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450 (1969) (noting that civil courts may only apply neutral 
principles of law to resolve church property disputes and cannot "determine matters at the 
very core of religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance 
of those doctrines to the religion" because "the First Amendment forbids civil courts from 
playing such a role"). 
127. Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of Va. v. Truro Church, 280 Va. 6, 28-29, 
694 S.E.2d 555, 567 (2010). 
128. Id. 
129. See id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
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whether a church will be deemed to have derived from another 
church is an ecclesiastical question, whether the derivation is 
based on the physical or the doctrinal. The resolution of these is-
sues is arguably the crux of the case and the crux of the statute. 
If TEC were a province of an overarching Anglican Communion 
that had power over TEC, joining the Church of Nigeria might 
count as joining a branch of the Anglican Communion-a church 
to which the dissenting congregations would have been attached 
through the Diocese and TEC. However, that is not the structure 
of the Anglican Communion. 130 The Anglican Communion is akin 
to a conference of churches that divides itself along geographical 
lines.131 It is not a church itself. 132 Given that the only relationship 
between TEC and CANA is the communion they share as mem-
bers of the Anglican Communion, the CANA Congregations 
aligned themselves with a church that is not related to TEC. 133 
The scenario may be described as such: the CANA congregations 
left TEC and joined a branch of another church. 134 Although that 
church is in brotherhood with TEC by way of the Anglican Com-
munion, 135 it is not a branch of TEC. 136 Leaving TEC and joining a 
wholly separate church is the right of the members of the congre-
gation. However, that would not trigger a property dispute cov-
ered by Virginia Code section 57-9(A)137 and may not trigger a 
property dispute at all. 138 The court declined to interpret Virginia 
Code section 57-9(A) more fully when it declined to distinguish 
more fully between leaving a hierarchical church and joining a 
130. See id. at 14, 694 S.E.2d at 558--59. 
131. Id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. at 14, 16, 694 S.E.2d at 559, 560 (noting both TEC and CANA are pro-
vinces of the Anglican Communion). 
134. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
135. See id. at 14, 16, 694 S.E.2d at 559, 560. 
136. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567 (''Thus, while CANA is an 'alternative polity' to which 
the congregations could and did attach themselves, we hold that, within the meaning of 
Code§ 57-9(A), CANA is not a 'branch' of either TEC or the Diocese to which the congrega-
tions could vote to join following the 'division' in TEC and the Diocese as contemplated by 
Code§ 57-9(A)."). 
137. Per its plain statutory language, Virginia Code section 57-9(A) only applies in the 
situation where a dissident congregation votes to belong to a branch of the church with 
which it was formally attached, not a church or religious society that merely possesses a 
shared communion with the original church. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 
& Cum. Supp. 2010). 
138. However, this issue will not be addressed as the general application of property 
law, trust law, and contract law is outside the scope of this comment. 
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branch of it. 139 That issue is not an abstract issue. It is an impor-
tant gateway issue to the ultimate interpretation of Virginia Code 
section 57 -9(A), and it is one of a number of issues the court left 
unresolved. 
V. WHERE DO WE Go FROM HERE? 
The court is clear that Virginia Code section 57-9(A) does not 
apply to this case. 140 The Virginia courts and the parties must look 
to real property law and contract law to resolve the dispute. 141 The 
broad question remains: whose property is it? Given that the 
property at issue is held in trust for the individual congrega-
tions, 142 the simple answer may be that the trustees of the proper-
ty retain control over the property and must use or dispose of it 
for the benefit of the congregation. However, at least three issues 
with ecclesiastical implications may arise before such a conclu-
sion can be reached. One issue focuses on what is the congrega-
tion for purposes of the continuing trustee/beneficiary relation-
ship. A second issue is whether a congregation that has been 
attached to a hierarchical church can leave that church. A third 
issue is under what circumstances, if any, such a congregation 
may take property with it. Many ways may exist to resolve these 
issues. All of them will involve addressing or specifically ignoring 
ecclesiastical issues or canon law. 
The majority of each of the CANA congregations voted to disaf-
filiate with the Episcopal Church.143 However, it is unclear what 
that means with respect to who is in the congregation in whose 
name the property is held in trust. That is, it is unclear whether 
the congregation-for the purposes of the trust relationship-
includes all of the members of the pre-disaffiliated congregation, 
only includes the congregation members who voted to remain affi-
liated with TEC, or only includes the congregation members who 
voted to leave TEC. If Virginia Code section 57 -9(A) applied to 
this case, the congregation as an entity presumably would have 
139. See Truro, 280 Va. at 28-29, 694 S.E.2d at 566--67. 
140. Id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
141. ld. 
142. ld. at 12, 694 S.E.2d at 557-58. 
143. See id. at 16, 694 S.E.2d at 560; Committee Report and Protocol for Departing 
Congregations from A. Hugo Blankingship, Jr., The Falls Church, et al., to the Rt. Rev. 
Peter J. Lee, Bishop of Virginia 2 (Sept. 28, 2006) (on file with author). 
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been deemed to have joined CANA-the putative branch of TEC. 
CANA's rules on membership would presumably apply, though 
the issue would not matter to any issue of substance. The proper-
ty dispute would be resolved. However, the statute does not ap-
ply .144 Consequently, it is unclear what the effect of the votes to 
disaffiliate may have had on the membership of the relevant con-
gregation. 
It is possible that the vote to disaffiliate has had no legal effect. 
The vote may be nothing more than an expression of displeasure 
with TEC felt by a majority of the congregation. However, the 
practical effect has been to convince the CANA Congregations 
that they have the right to exclude from the parish property the 
congregants who voted to remain in TEC.145 Not surprisingly, the 
congregants who voted to remain affiliated with TEC want to use 
the parish property .146 
If the vote has no legal effect, the congregation is presumably 
comprised of either those who chose to stay in TEC or the entire 
congregation at the time of the vote adjusted by the members who 
have formally joined or left the congregation since the vote. How-
ever, the issue would seem to be one to be resolved by the internal 
rules of TEC and the Diocese. The issue may be complicated un-
der canon law given that the dissenters voted to leave TEC. 147 The 
courts may want no part of resolving the substance of that dis-
pute, given that it is fraught with ecclesiastical issues. Indeed, 
they could avoid entanglement by allowing internal church policy 
to resolve the dispute. Nonetheless, the issue needs to be resolved 
for purposes of determining who should be able to exercise prop-
erty rights over the parish property until the case is ultimately 
resolved. 
The second issue is related to whether a congregation can leave 
a hierarchical church. The court determined that the CANA Con-
gregations were clearly affiliated with TEC and the Diocese of 
144. Truro, 280 Va. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
145. See Terms of Standstill Agreement, Approved by the Standing Committee and Ex-
ecutive Board of the Diocese of Virginia (Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://www.docstoc. 
com/docs/2937334. 
146. In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 76 Va. Cir. 785, 826 (Cir. Ct. 
2008) (Fairfax County). 
147. See Resolution of the Executive Board of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the 
Diocese of Virginia (Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with author). 
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Virginia before the vote to disaffiliate. 148 A congregation or parish 
is literally a part of a diocese149 and must accede to the canons and 
constitutions of TEC and the Diocese. 150 Individuals may leave 
TEC. 151 However, it is unclear under canon law whether parishes 
or congregations can leave TEC. It appears that a congregation 
may cease to exist under Virginia law. 152 Similarly, a parish may 
cease to exist under canon law.153 However, it is unclear that a 
congregation or parish may literally leave and still be recognized 
as an entity that, prior to leaving, was an Episcopal congregation 
or parish. Whether a congregation can leave TEC-as opposed to 
disbanding and reforming with a similar membership-would ap-
pear to be an ecclesiastical question.154 
The third issue is whether a congregation can leave a hierar-
chical church and take property with it. This issue is only rele-
vant if the first two issues can be resolved to the benefit of the 
disaffiliating congregations. The clash of property interests 
makes the issue important. A congregation, as a direct benefi-
ciary of the trust relationship, has property interests in the sub-
ject property. 155 However, all of the subject congregations were at-
tached to TEC and the Diocese. 156 Consequently, it is quite likely 
that the TEC and the Diocese of Virginia also have property in-
terests in the subject property. 157 Indeed, the entire point to this 
148. Truro, 280 Va. at 14-15, 694 S.E.2d at 559. 
149. THE GENERAL CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CONSTITUTION & CANONS 
51 (The Archives of the Episcopal Church, eds., 2009) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION & 
CANONS]. 
150. See id. at 64. 
151. See id. at 14~9. 
152. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-11, -15 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (discussing the implications for 
trustees when a congregation becomes extinct). 
153. At the least, it may be returned to mission status. See CONSTITUTION & CANONS, 
supra note 149, at 41 (establishing that property will be held in trust for a parish "so long 
as the particular Parish ... remains a part of, and subject to, this Church and its Consti-
tutions and Canons"). 
154. If Virginia Code section 57-9(A) is constitutional, it would appear to allow a con-
gregation to remain intact in legal form after leaving a hierarchical church. However, the 
issue of that section's constitutionality was not addressed in Truro. 
155. Marcus, Santoro & Kozak, P.C. v. Hung-Lin Wu, 274 Va. 743, 751, 652 S.E.2d 777, 
781 (2007) (quoting Broaddus v. Gresham, 181 Va. 725, 731-32, 26 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1943)). 
156. Truro, 280 Va. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
157. See id. 
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case is that there are clashing interests. 158 The issue is whether 
the congregation's interests can override and sever TEC's inter-
ests. 
The issue that must be resolved and that Virginia courts have 
avoided thus far focuses on the nature of the relationship that ex-
ists among the property, the congregation, and TEC when the 
property is held in trust for the congregation. This issue can be 
resolved conceptually in at least three different ways, though the 
three different solutions are not equally available under either 
Virginia or canon law. First, a trustee may hold the property for 
the congregation alone. If one considers the congregation an au-
tonomous entity that can leave the church, it might make sense 
to allow the congregation to take the subject property and exit. 
Second, a trustee may hold the property for the congregation and 
the Diocese, but hold the property for the benefit of the congrega-
tion as a limitation on what the Diocese can do with the property. 
The trustee may hold the property in this manner so that there 
will be property for the congregation's use as long as the congre-
gation exists. 159 This might restrict the Diocese from repurposing 
the property during the congregation's existence.160 Of course, if 
the congregation ceased to exist, the Diocese might be the entity 
with a superior interest in the property and might be able to re-
purpose or dispose of the property. 161 This vision might be sensible 
if it is thought that individual parishioners may leave a congrega-
tion or the Diocese but that congregations cannot leave the Dio-
cese. Third, a trustee may hold the property for TEC or the Dio-
cese through the congregation. That is, given that the 
congregation or parish has acceded to the canons and constitu-
tions of TEC and the Diocese, one could consider the property as 
the hierarchical church's property held for the benefit of the con-
158. See id. at 16-18, 694 S.E.2d at 560-61. 
159. See generally CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 149, at 41, 64 (discussing the 
means by which property is held for a church); THE DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA, CONSTITUTION 
AND CANONS 26-27 (2008) [hereinafter DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA] (discussing the means by 
which property is held for Episcopal churches in Virginia). 
160. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-15 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (outlining the procedure by which 
abandoned property previously held by a religious group may be transferred when such 
religious group is "extinct"). See generally CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 149, at 
40-41, 64; DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 159, at 26 (discussing the conveyance of 
abandoned property). 
161. See§ 57·15; DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 159, at 26 ("[S]o that the same may 
be regarded as abandoned property by the Executive Board, which shall have the authori-
ty ... to take charge and custody thereof."). 
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gregation.162 This conception of the relationship would suggest 
that even if a congregation could leave the Diocese intact, its 
rights in the property would not override the Diocese's rights. Of 
course, this conception is most sensible if one considers the con-
gregation or parish a part of the Diocese that no longer has the 
ability to leave the Diocese.163 How Virginia courts proceed to de-
termine the nature of the relationship or whether the courts 
couch the issue in precisely this way is not clear. However, the is-
sue is lurking in the dispute, and it is an ecclesiastical one.164 
All three issues raised above require the consideration of signif-
icant ecclesiastical questions. Each of these issues could be re-
solved without entangling Virginia courts in ecclesiastical issues 
if TEC were allowed to determine the issues based on internal 
canon law. However, Virginia courts have an obligation to resolve 
the issues in accord with Virginia law as long as the courts do not 
enmesh themselves too thoroughly in issues of church doctrine.165 
The Supreme Court of Virginia provided little if any guidance on 
any of the issues mentioned above. It is not the court's responsi-
bility to resolve issues not before it. 166 However, some of these is-
sues arguably were before it. 
Virginia Code section 57 -9(A) is about resolving property dis-
putes.167 It may well be that Virginia Code section 57-9(A) back-
handedly resolves the issues in this case. Colloquially, a property 
dispute may arise whenever two entities claim to own or have the 
right to use property. However, Virginia Code section 57-9(A) ap-
plies to a more limited style of property dispute: a dispute be-
162. See generally CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 149, at 41, 64 ("All real ... 
property held ... for the benefit of any ... Congregation is held in trust for this Church 
and the Diocese thereof."); DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 159, at 26 ("All real and per-
sonal property held by or for the benefit of any Church or Mission within this Diocese is 
held in trust for The Episcopal Church and the Diocese of Virginia."). 
163. See Truro, 280 Va. at 15-17, 694 S.E.2d at 559-60 (noting that Truro Church's ac-
tions to leave TEC were ineffective according to TEC). 
164. See id. 
165. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("[T]he [First] Amendment therefore commands civil 
courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over 
religious doctrine."); Harris v. Royer, 165 Va. 461, 465, 182 S.E. 276, 278 (1935) (noting 
that a court may "neither amend or annul [a] statute ... unless it [is] unconstitutional" 
(quoting Matthews v. Warner's Adm'r., 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 570, 578 (1877))). 
166. Truro, 280 Va. at 79 n.ll, 694 S.E.2d at 567 n.11. 
167. In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 76 Va. Cir. 960, 964 (Cir. Ct. 
2008) (Fairfax City) (noting that "§ 57-9(A) is a statute that determines property rights 
upon a division in a church or religious society"). 
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tween a hierarchical church and one of its congregations sur-
rounding property that is held in trust for the benefit of the con-
gregation.168 It is possible that Virginia Code section 57-9(A) pro-
vides the only way for a congregation to separate itself from a 
hierarchical church.169 It could be thought that the statute only 
applies in certain situations and appears to resolve specific types 
of property disputes-disputes where there is confusion about 
which church a congregation is affiliated with or where there is a 
legitimate choice for the congregation to make regarding to which 
of two churches it ought to be deemed attached.l7° Arguably, un-
less one of these two types of disputes exists, the parish or con-
gregation is considered to remain attached to the church to which 
it was originally attached. 171 
It may be that situations covered by Virginia Code section 57-
9(A) are the only situations in which ecclesiastical property dis-
putes are intractable. It is possible that no property dispute exists 
in situations not covered by Virginia Code section 57-9(A) or that 
they can be handled relatively easily without a special statute. 
The issue of the application of the statute and the existence of a 
property dispute may dissolve if a court decides that the statute 
exists to deal with issues of discord in situations where ownership 
is unclear and intractable, not situations where a majority of 
members of a congregation are unhappy about the direction of the 
hierarchical church.172 That may be the situation in Truro. It is 
possible that no serious property dispute exists. 173 Truro may 
simply involve a situation in which a majority of members of var-
ious congregations are unhappy about TEC's stand on church is-
sues and have decided to leave the denomination.174 If this is the 
situation, this case could be resolved easily. However, if this case 
168. VA. CODE ANN. 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010); see Norfolk Presby-
tery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 502, 201 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1974) (citing Baber v. Caldwell, 
207 Va. 694, 698, 152 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1967)). 
169. See§ 57-9(A). 
170. See Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 76 n.4 (Cal. 2009) (noting that "[a] sta-
tute governing specifically church property obviously is not developed for use in all proper-
ty disputes"). 
171. Truro, 280 Va. at 27-28, 694 S.E.2d at 55~7 (passing the distinction between 
"branches" of a faith for purposes of section 57 -9(A)). 
172. See id. at 15-19, 694 S.E.2d at 559-62 (discussing the events leading to the Truro 
case). 
173. See id. at 15-16, 694 S.E.2d at 559-60 (noting that the underlying action stems 
from the approval of the election of Gene Robinson as an Episcopal bishop). 
174. !d. 
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is a bit more than that and a serious property dispute remains, 
this litigation may have a long way to go. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Virginia Code section 57 -9(A) is supposed to resolve particular 
church property disputes without entangling the courts in eccle-
siastical issues. 175 Given that Virginia Code section 57-9(A) does 
not apply to this particular case, the courts may have to navigate 
a thicket of ecclesiastical issues despite the efforts of the Supreme 
Court of Virginia to avoid those issues.176 The Virginia courts 
could navigate the thicket by recognizing that the issues are ec-
clesiastical and ceding the issues to internal church canon law or 
by addressing the issues without becoming too entangled with 
those ecclesiastical issues. However it is to be resolved, the 
church property dispute that is the basis of this case still exists, 
and the Virginia courts will certainly look for a neutral principle 
to resolve the matter. 177 The Supreme Court of Virginia has, so 
far, avoided addressing ecclesiastical issues in Truro, 118 but it is 
unclear that the dispute underlying this case can ultimately be 
resolved without doing so. 
175. Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
176. Id. at 29 n.ll, 694 S.E.2d at 567 n.ll. 
177. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (noting that while civil courts may only apply neutral principles 
of law to resolve church property disputes and cannot "determine matters at the very core 
of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those 
doctrines to the religion" because "the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing 
such a role"). 
178. Truro, 280 Va. at 29 n.11, 694 S.E.2d at 567 n.ll. 
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